The False Case for Cooperation With China

Engagement always comes at a price. The CCP is realist to the core, caring only about China. When it sees the U.S. government requesting cooperation, it sees leverage.

In his excellent new book, Breaking the Engagement, China scholar David Shambaugh details how the U.S. policy consensus toward China has shifted from engagement to, at a minimum, competition, with some now calling for outright decoupling.

Shambaugh documents how the engagement camp dominated U.S.-China policy from Nixon to Obama. But thanks to Trump and other realists pointing out the obvious—that China is not a normal country and is engaged in techno-economic predation—the engagers are now fighting a rearguard action against those calling for competition.

Nonetheless, even after 50 years, engagement remains entrenched, especially outside the Trump administration. For the engagers, engagement is paramount, which means the U.S. government should avoid pressing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) too hard, especially over its trade and economic mercantilism. Doing so might reduce, or even—heaven forbid—eliminate engagement.

This mindset is on full display in a recent attack on a leading voice in the competition camp, Princeton scholar Aaron Friedberg. A group of engagers wrote in Foreign Affairs: “Friedberg calls not for mere competition but for an antagonistic rivalry that minimizes any attempt at cooperation.” They even added: “A pragmatic policy would recognize the value of economic ties with China and encourage continued Sino-U.S. cooperation in many critical areas, including technology.”

But explain this: How has any Chinese technology or trade policy helped, on net, rather than hurt U.S. tech companies and jobs? For this still-powerful camp, cooperation is the paramount goal—even when responding to Chinese aggression gets in the way. And they’re right about one thing: If the U.S. presses China on matters of true national interest or even survival, cooperation will get much harder.

However, why is it America’s job to be the desperate suitor—going out of its way to be nice to the CCP just to keep the conversation going?

There are at least two major problems with the engagement crowd.

First, they’re so focused on engagement for its own sake that they invent an endless list of areas we must cooperate on. But if any of these issues are important to China, why isn’t the CCP the one seeking U.S. cooperation and offering concessions in return?

And if these issues matter only to us, then why are we pursuing them, especially when many relate to global concerns that either don’t affect us directly or could be addressed unilaterally? The answer is simple: Much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment prioritizes “governing the world” over advancing U.S. interests, especially in techno-economic capabilities. The engagers, notably, show little interest in the latter.

Second, and more importantly, engagement always comes at a price. The CCP is realist to the core, caring only about China. When it sees the U.S. government requesting cooperation, it sees leverage. The price? The U.S. must back on off key issues, especially Beijing’s predatory trade, tech, and economic behavior that’s harming our economy.

It would be one thing if these issues were truly vital and could be addressed through “cooperation.” But most either don’t matter or can’t be resolved in that way. Just look at the CCP’s preferred “cooperation” agenda. Following the 2023 San Francisco summit between Biden and Xi, the agreed-upon deliverables included increased cooperation on artificial intelligence, the establishment of a working group to promote tourism, counter-narcotics collaboration, joint efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking, enhanced climate cooperation, increased airline flights, and expanded people-to-people exchanges. Later, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said, “We’re ready to coordinate on climate, health security, global macroeconomic stability, and new challenges like the risks posed by artificial intelligence.”

But no one ever asks the obvious: Why do we need to cooperate on these things? They’re simply taken as given. However, they should be questioned, as every item is either unnecessary, unimportant, or something countries can handle on their own.

Let’s look at each one:

• AI: Why exactly should we cooperate on AI? The United States doesn’t need Chinese input to regulate AI domestically—Congress can legislate if needed. We don’t rely on foreign nations to ensure our drugs are safe; we have the FDA. AI is no different. And concerns over "killer AI" are largely science fiction. As for battlefield use, does anyone seriously believe the U.S. should limit its AI capabilities based on an agreement with the CCP? If you do, I have a bridge to sell you.

• Tourism promotion: Really? Why should the U.S. care about promoting tourism with China, and why would it require bilateral cooperation?

• Counter-narcotics cooperation: If this is a CCP priority, let them ask us for help.

• Fentanyl trafficking: You must be joking. The CCP could shut down the flow of fentanyl precursors to the United States next week. The fact that they haven’t proves this isn’t about “cooperation.” It’s more like asking a neighbor, “Can we cooperate so you stop dumping sewage in my yard?”

• Airline flights: If the U.S. wants more flights from China, the FAA can make that happen. If the CCP wants more flights from the U.S., it can do so. No "cooperation" necessary.

• People-to-people exchanges: See above re: airline flights.

• Health security: Let’s get this straight: the CCP may have created and unleashed the COVID-19 virus (even if inadvertently), and whether or not it was zoonotic, it covered up the outbreak and manipulated the World Health Organization to do its bidding. And we’re supposed to cooperate with a government that did that?

• Macroeconomic stability: China has a massive, long-running trade surplus with the world while actively trying to deindustrialize the West. Why would we ask them for help with global macroeconomic stability? And again, presumably, China has an interest in maintaining macroeconomic stability in the face of a global financial collapse or a massive recession. So why aren’t they the ones initiating?

• Climate change: Ah yes, the big kahuna. But if China is also worried about climate change, why aren’t they begging the United States to do more? Why should we beg them? The reality is simple: climate change won’t be solved until clean energy technology becomes the same cost or cheaper than dirty energy. No amount of “cooperation” will fix that. China will keep increasing emissions until it’s in its own economic interest to stop.

To be clear, I certainly understand that diplomacy with China matters. But the idea that we need China’s help on these issues—and that this should prevent us from pressing back against its techno-economic aggression against our economy, U.S. companies, and allied nations’ economies and firms—is bankrupt.

The truth is that we are long past the point when the U.S. government could meaningfully influence China’s policy or behavior. The first Obama administration was the last real opportunity. It’s time to stop playing the supplicant and start defending our economy from Chinese techno-economic aggression.